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Abstract
Over the last 23 years, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has required over
34,000 companies to file over 165,000 annual reports. These reports, the so-called “Form
10-Ks,” contain a characterization of a company’s financial performance and its risks,
including the regulatory environment in which a company operates. In this paper, we
analyze over 4.5 million references to U.S. Federal Acts and Agencies contained within these
reports to build a mean-field measurement of temperature and diversity in this regulatory
ecosystem, where companies are organisms inhabiting the regulatory environment. While
individuals across the political, economic, and academic world frequently refer to trends in
this regulatory ecosystem, far less attention has been paid to supporting such claims with
large-scale, longitudinal data. In this paper, we document an increase in the regulatory
energy per filing, i.e., a warming “temperature.” We also find that the diversity of the
regulatory ecosystem has been increasing over the past two decades, as measured by the
dimensionality of the regulatory space and distance between the “regulatory bitstrings”
of companies. These findings support the claim that regulatory activity and complexity
are increasing, and this measurement framework contributes an important step towards
improving academic and policy discussions around legal complexity and regulation.
Keywords: complex systems, natural language, temperature, diversity, legal complexity,
regulation
1. Introduction
Economies, like ecosystems, exhibit dy-
namic, complex behaviors resulting from
the interaction of “organisms” inhabiting
and altering their “environment.” In the
case of economies, organisms can be seen as
companies, and environments can be seen,
at least in part, as regulations. Just as
changes in the environment like rising tem-
perature can harm or help organisms, either
broadly or for specific regions or organisms,
so too can regulation harm or help compa-
nies. Yet unlike studies of biological ecosys-
tems, studies of the economy have thus far
lacked a longitudinal, empirical measure of
fundamental environment factors like “tem-
perature” or “species diversity.” In this pa-
per, we attempt to bridge this gap, finding
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support for the common claim that regula-
tory activity and complexity has increased
over the last 20 years.
Each year, companies that meet the reg-
istration requirements under the Securities
and Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and
1934 must file an annual report with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”). This report, the so-called Form
10-K as defined in sections 13 and 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. § 78o or 78o(d)), provides a broad
overview of a company’s performance and
its risks. Unlike other sources of informa-
tion, the statements contained within these
reports are certified and attested to by both
a company’s officers and its independent au-
ditors. If these statements are negligent or
fraudulent, the SEC, Department of Jus-
tice, and shareholders are all able to press
civil and, in limited cases, criminal charges
against officers and auditors.
The law encourages and sometimes re-
quires disclosure, but the incentives for
firms are not entirely one-sided. Countering
the trend towards limitless disclosure is the
competition for investor capital. Through
their annual reports, companies generally
seek to present themselves as better in-
vestment opportunities than their competi-
tors. Their officers thus face a balancing
act as between describing a pessimistic fu-
ture full of potential risks and an optimistic
future without any risks. While certainly
not a perfect description of reality, no other
source of information, including surveys and
press releases, provides as comprehensive of
a statement of the environment in which
companies operate.
While 10-Ks contain a significant amount
of information regarding risks facing the
company, we are particularly interested in
the regulatory risk and uncertainty high-
lighted in these filings. Thus, in this paper,
we analyze more than 20 years, 30,000 com-
panies, and 160,000 10-K reports to iden-
tify more than 4.5 million references to U.S.
Federal regulatory Acts and Agencies. Us-
ing these references, we generate a repro-
ducible, quantitative, and longitudinal mea-
surement of the temperature and diversity
of the U.S. regulatory “ecosystem.” We
document a clear trend towards increas-
ing total energy, temperature, and diver-
sity, with double- to triple-digit growth in
all measurements. We believe this frame-
work and its ongoing application represent
a principled approach to the quantification
of both the global and various local regu-
latory ecosystems, and we hope that this
research can drive better-grounded discus-
sions of legal complexity and policy design
in the modern world.
2. Data
10-K filings have been the focus of many
academic studies in finance and accounting
[1], [2], [3], [4], law [5], [6] and other adjacent
fields [7], [8], [9]. Many of these studies have
focused upon questions such as whether the
reporting requirements are achieving their
intended purpose and the extent to which
markets react to the information disclosed
in such findings. While these are certainly
worthy questions in their own right, we be-
lieve these filings reveal important patterns
that, at scale and over time, provide mean-
ingful insight into a range of other scientific
questions.
Companies that meet the requirements
for 10-K reporting expend significant and
increasing resources to prepare these doc-
uments, typically with the assistance of ac-
counting firms and lawyers. Indeed, the An-
nual Audit Fee Survey [10] conducted by the
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Financial Executives Research Foundation
reveals a mean and median 2015 expense
of $1.8M and $522,205, respectively, across
over 6,000 filers. As required by law, the fig-
ures and statements contained within these
reports are certified and attested to by both
a company’s officers and its independent au-
ditors. Therefore, unlike other sources of
information, in general, these 10-K annual
reports are more likely to convey compre-
hensive and realistic description of the en-
vironment in which companies operate.
Form 10-K filings generally contain at
least four parts and fifteen schedules, which
collectively offer a wealth of useful infor-
mation about registered companies. These
parts include a characterization of a com-
pany’s financial health, legal risks, and
other systematic and idiosyncratic factors,
such as the nature of the regulatory envi-
ronment in which it operates. Some of these
factors, such as tax credits, may be positive,
but the majority of listed regulatory factors
are present as risks. While there are a num-
ber of specific requirements under the law,
firms and industries are provided with some
latitude regarding how to satisfy reporting
requirements. In addition, as explored in
[1] and [5], there have been some important
changes in the reporting rules over time.
That said, SEC form templates and ac-
counting firm standards result in more simi-
larity than difference across firms and across
time.
Through this exercise of risk factor dis-
closure, companies typically describe vari-
ous sources of regulatory risk, including the
laws and administrative agencies that are
most relevant to their respective businesses.
Consider, for example, the 2015 10-K filing
of Trans Energy, Inc., an oil and gas ex-
ploration company. Among other statutory
and agency references, their filing references
both the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918
and Endangered Species Act of 1973:
The Endangered Species
Act (“ESA”) was established to
protect endangered and threat-
ened species. Pursuant to that act,
if a species is listed as threatened
or endangered, restrictions may be
imposed on activities adversely af-
fecting that species’ habitat. Sim-
ilar protections are offered to mi-
gratory birds under the Migra-
tory Bird Treaty Act. The
Company conducts operations on
oil and natural gas leases that have
species, such as raptors, that are
listed and species, such as sage
grouse, that could be listed as
threatened or endangered under
the ESA.
Across the broader set of required com-
pany disclosures, 10-K filings are filled with
references such as these; some, such as cita-
tions to sections 13 and 15(d) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934, are boilerplate
and required by the SEC’s forms. Others,
such as the 756 references to the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act of 1918, or the 27 refer-
ences to the Price-Anderson Nuclear Indus-
tries Indemnity Act of 1957 over the last 23
years, are not.
In the mid-1990s, the SEC introduced its
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and
Retrieval (“EDGAR”) system. Since then,
nearly all registered company 10-K reports
have been uploaded and made available on
EDGAR, resulting in more than 160,000 10-
K reports accessible online. We retrieve
these 10-K reports and build a multi-stage
pipeline that identifies and normalizes ref-
erences to Acts and Agencies. References
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are first identified through standard natu-
ral language processing techniques; once a
reference fragment is identified, it is then
passed through a second stage of normal-
ization. As one example, many filers ref-
erence the “Gramm Leach Bliley Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999;” how-
ever, they do not do so using its full name,
as above. Instead, they frequently refer
to it as “GLB,” “Graham Leach Bliley,”
“Gramm Leach Bliley,” or the “Financial
Services Modernization” Act. In order to
handle this variation, we built a mapping for
over 600 potential Act references, relying on
a combination of the US Code, Wikipedia,
and manual review. This mapping is then
combined with fuzzy-string matching tech-
niques to correct for spelling mistakes such
as “Graham Leach Bliley.” The result is
a high-precision and high-recall extraction
of 401 unique Federal Acts and 133 Agen-
cies across our 23-year dataset. In total,
we identify more than 4.5 million Act and
Agency references contained in 10-K reports
over the past 23 years.
3. Methodology and Results
Temperature, at its theoretical basis, is a
measure of energy per unit of area or vol-
ume. The more energy per unit of space,
c.p., the higher the temperature. While the
actual behavior of matter may vary based
on whether this energy is vibrational, rota-
tional, or translational, temperature per se
provides an incredibly valuable mean-field
characterization of the behavior thermody-
namic system.
In our context, each reference to an Act
or Agency is equivalent to some energy ex-
pended by an accountant, attorney, or com-
pany to describe some dimension of regu-
latory exposure. While not every poten-
tial exposure a company faces is listed, and
those that are listed do not have an “equal”
energy that can be measured in J or W ,
these counts overall correspond to the total
number and range of regulatory concepts
addressed therein. This therefore allows
us to leverage these references to provide
a mean-field characterization of the overall
regulatory environment inhabited by regis-
tered companies.
Like the global mean temperature of the
Earth itself, there are certainly localized
“regulatory micro-climates” whose temper-
ature differs from the global climate. We
appreciate that these micro-climates are of
great importance across many professional
and academic questions, but for purposes of
this paper, we focus on aggregate, longitu-
dinal patterns in this paper, relying on mil-
lions of references in hundreds of thousands
of filings for tens of thousands of companies
across more than two decades.
To operationalize these ideas, we first de-
fine a regulatory “space” and filing “pro-
file.” The regulatory space consists of 401
dimensions - one for each discrete Act cur-
rently identified in our data. We can repre-
sent a filling as a vector in this regulatory
space. In the simplest form, a 10-K profile
~p(a) has element pi(a) equal to the num-
ber of references to Act i for a company a’s
annual filing. This vector ~p can then be nor-
malized or projected. For example, we can
project ~p from the number of references to a
“bitstring” vector ~b(a), whose element bi(a)
is equal to 1 if a company a’s filing mentions
Act i at least once, else 0. Alternatively, we
can aggregate or normalize these filings by
viewing them as a time-indexed collection.
Let F (t) be the matrix whose rows corre-
spond to the set of all ~p or ~b vectors filed
within a given year t. Then the grand sum
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of F (t) is the total number of references,
the jth column sum of F (t) is the number
of references to the jth Act, and the ith row
sum is the number of references per firm in
year t. It is possible normalize the number
of references per Act to a rate of reference
per filing by dividing the column sums of
F (t) by the number of rows m(t), which we
call ~rj(t) for j
th Act in year t.
We then use these representations to mea-
sure the total energy, temperature, and di-
versity of the regulatory ecosystem as fol-
lows. First, we measure the total energy of
the regulatory ecosystem using p-vectors as:
E(t) =
∑
i
∑
j
Fi,j(t) (1)
Figure 1 shows that the total energy, as
measured by number of references to Acts
per year, has increased substantially in the
last 23 years. In 1996, there were just over
40,000 references to Acts in the nearly 5,000
filings that year; by 2006, these numbers
had more than quadrupled to nearly 200,000
references in just over 9,000 filings; and,
through three quarters of 2016, these num-
bers have again increased to an annualized
rate of over 300,000 references.
Total energy alone can be misleading with
respect to policy interpretations, however,
as there are a number of reasons why en-
ergy may change without relation to regu-
latory exposure or “burden.” For example,
i) the economy may grow or shrink in real or
nominal terms, increasing or decreasing the
number of companies or companies meeting
registration requirement, ii) the SEC rules
governing registration or filings may change,
increasing or decreasing the number of com-
panies or references, or iii) c.p., the relative
incentives to incorporate or take on share-
holders may change, increasing or decreas-
ing the number of companies registered.
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Figure 1: Total number of Act references per filing
over time.
These factors do not necessarily imply more
or less regulation as experienced by indi-
vidual companies, although they may be
viewed as endogenous to some policy ques-
tions.
We can control for these factors by nor-
malizing total energy to temperature, tak-
ing into account the number of filings per
year as an analogy to area or volume. To
do so, we calculate the average rate of ref-
erences per filing, “temperature,” T (t) as
follows:
T (t) =
E(t)
m(t)
(2)
Figure 2 shows that, over the last 23
years, T (t) has been monotonically increas-
ing. While the rate of reference, like the to-
tal energy in Figure 1 above, clearly shows
the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley changes in
2003, this trend remains unbroken both well
before and well after. In 1996, the average
number of references per filing was 8.4; by
2006, it had more than doubled to 20.9; and
by 2016, the rate had increased again by
more than 50% to 31.7 Act references per
filing. Even if the amount of energy or cost
does not scale linearly per filing with the
5
number of references, the monotonic, 237%
increase in T (t) clearly demonstrates an in-
creasing regulatory temperature.
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Figure 2: Average number of Act references per
filing over time.
Table 1 below summarizes the data from
Figures 1 and 2 above.
Year E(t) T (t)
1995 17,672 7.9
2000 75,851 10.6
2005 166,518 18.2
2010 227,210 25.0
2015 242,107 30.8
Table 1: Summary of energy and temperature mea-
sures over time.
Finally, we may ask - is temperature or
energy changing in concert with diversity, or
is the change in temperature concentrated
along a single dimension of regulation? For
example, changes in energy or temperature
can represent more or less reliance on the
same Act, e.g., the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934; in this case, the number of unique
Acts referenced is not changing, but the
regulatory exposure per Act is. Alterna-
tively, the total number of unique Acts ref-
erenced could be increasing or decreasing;
for example, in 2003, most registered com-
panies added references to the recently en-
acted Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which had not
previously been referenced. Changes such
as these represent an increase or decrease
in the number of dimensions or diversity of
regulatory exposure, but not necessarily the
intensity of each exposure.
Using our notation above, we evaluate the
diversity question by calculating two mea-
sures. First, we calculate the number of
unique Acts per filing through the sum of
b vectors above. Then, we calculate the
average number of unique Acts per filing,
across all companies in a given year; this is
1
m
∑
j
∑
i b
j
i , where b
j
i is the bit correspond-
ing to whether the ith Act was referenced in
the jth company filing and m is the number
of companies per year.
Figure 3 shows that, over the last 23
years, the diversity of Acts referenced has
increased jointly with temperature. Like
Figures 1 and 2 above, the time series
exhibits a jump following Sarbanes-Oxley;
however, like Figure 2, the time series
also exhibits a monotonic increase over two
decades, growing from 3.1 unique Acts per
filing in 1996 to 5.6 unique Acts per fil-
ing in 2006 to 7.9 Acts per filing in 2016.
This increase suggests that the increase in
regulatory ecosystem temperature has been,
at least in part, related to an increase in
the number of regulatory “micro-climates”
present in the global regulatory ecosystem.
As an additional measure of diversity, we
analyze each company’s yearly regulatory
“bitstring.” As noted earlier, we calculate
the 401-bit vector b for each company-year,
where each bit corresponds to the presence
of the 401 discrete Acts we identify. Al-
though the regulatory space has 401 di-
mensions, the bitstring for a given filing is
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Figure 3: Average number of unique Acts and
Agencies per filing over time.
likely to be extremely sparse. For example,
consider the 2012 10-K filed by the Boeing
Company. Their filing features a bitstring
with 12 non-zero elements, including Acts
such as the Homeland Security Act, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
the Patient Protection And Affordable Care
Act and the American Taxpayer Relief. Al-
ternatively, the 2014 10-K of Facebook Inc.
features 10 unique elements, including The
Bank Secrecy Act, the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, the USA Patriot Act, and the
Credit CARD Act.
After applying this formalization to all
companies for all years, we calculate the av-
erage pairwise Hamming distance [11] be-
tween all company bitstrings in a given year.
Hamming distance is commonly used to
evaluate the diversity of genomic [12], [13],
[14] and other related data [15], [16], [17]. It
can be interpreted as proportional to the av-
erage number of regulatory dimensions not
in common between companies. More ex-
plicitly, the Hamming distance between two
companies a and b in year t is:
da,b(t) =
∑
i
~p(a)⊕ ~p(b) (3)
where ⊕ is the element-wise XOR opera-
tor. We can then write the average Ham-
ming distance d¯(t) as the average over all
combinations of a and b at t. Figure 4 visu-
alizes the structure of the distance matrix
D for all a, b as of 1994. The large block
in the lower right corresponds primarily to
special purpose vehicles like trusts or lim-
ited partnerships, and the overall structure
corresponds to sectors and industries.
Company
C
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0
4
8
12
16
20
Figure 4: Hamming distance heatmap for 1994 Act
bitstrings.
Figure 5, the average Hamming distance
d¯(t) over time for Acts and Agencies, por-
trays mean-field distance between firms
at scale, confirming an increasing diver-
sity across the global regulatory ecosystem.
Over time, companies are subject, on aver-
age, to increasingly different requirements.
While not monotonically increasing like the
rate of reference and number of unique refer-
ences above, the average distance increases
18 of 23 years in the sample. In 1996, two
firms were separated on average by fewer
than four regulatory Act “bits” or “genes”;
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by 2016, this number has increased to nearly
10.
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Figure 5: Average pairwise Hamming distance be-
tween company filing regulatory bitstrings over
time.
Table 2 summarizes the data from Figures
3 and 4 above.
Year Average Unique Acts d¯(t)
1995 2.9 3.7
2000 3.6 4.5
2005 5.0 6.1
2010 6.2 6.8
2015 7.5 8.9
Table 2: Summary of diversity measures over time.
4. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented the first
large-scale, longitudinal characterization of
the energy, temperature, and diversity of
the regulatory ecosystem. We have identi-
fied increasing regulatory exposure along an
increasing number of dimensions, providing
evidence in support of the claim that regula-
tory burden is increasing. Using a bitstring
representation of firm regulatory exposure,
we have confirmed that the aggregate Fed-
eral regulatory ecosystem is becoming more
diverse over time, providing evidence in sup-
port of the claim that regulatory complexity
is increasing. These conclusions are based
on more than 20 years, 30,000 companies,
160,000 10-K reports, and 4.5 million refer-
ences contained in uniquely comprehensive
and accurate 10-K reports.
In future work, we intend to expand
upon these questions and connect to ex-
tant research agenda, including the cate-
gorization of regulatory “species” and “cli-
mates” through their time series signa-
tures and linguistic markers, a mapping of
the time-dependent, tri-partite network of
firms, Acts, and Agencies, and the integra-
tion of this analysis with our existing work
on the complexity of other US statutory,
regulatory, and judicial systems [18], [19].
Our work contributes to both the broader
literature on legal complexity [20], [21], [22]
and efforts to document the physical prop-
erties of legal systems as complex adaptive
systems [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28]. In
addition, this paper is among a growing set
of recent works applying tools of machine
learning and natural language processing to
better understand the behavior of various
legal systems [29], [30], [31].
In sum, we believe that this framework
for representation and measurement will
contribute to ongoing academic and policy
discussions around legal complexity and
policy design. The continued development
of both global and local regulatory indices
can provide for a principled, empirical basis
of evaluation, standing in stark contrast
to some of the vague generalizations that
frequently guide current discourse.
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